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DOUBLE TROUBLE: LEGAL SOLUTIONS TO THE MEDICAL
PROBLEMS OF UNCONSENTED SPERM HARVESTING AND
DRUG-INDUCED MULTIPLE PREGNANCIES

RONALD CHESTER*
Why seek ye the living among the dead?
-Luke1
Death does not end all things.
-Sextus Propertius2

* Professor of Law, New England School of Law in Boston; B.A. Harvard, 1966; J.D. and
Masters of International Affairs, Columbia, 1970; Diploma in Criminology, Cambridge (Eng.),
1971. Professor Chester is the author of the award-winning book INHERITANCE, WEALTH AND
SOCIETY (1982), and has taught Wills, Trusts, and Estates at seven American law schools. The
author would like to thank Jamie Blum, J.D. New England 2000 (expected) for her work on the
early stages of this project. The author is also grateful for the energy, care and intelligence
exhibited by his current research assistant, Kathryn Colson, J.D. New England 2000 (expected).
She did a truly remarkable job.
Professor Chester also would like to thank his colleague, Professor Barbara Plumeri, for
her insightful comments on an early draft. Finally, he is grateful to the James R. Lawton Summer
Stipend Program for funding the project, and to the New England School of Law and Dean John
O’Brien for their encouragement and support.
1. Luke 24:5.
2. Sextus Propertius, Elegies, in PUTNAM’S DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS 565b (1930). See
also PROPERTIUS 307 (H.E. Butler trans., 1962) where the line is translated slightly differently:
“death is not the end of all.”
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There was an old woman who lived in a shoe,
She had so many children she didn’t know what to do;
She gave them some broth without any bread;
She whipped them all soundly and put them to bed.
-Anonymous3
Every baby born into the world is a finer one than the last.
-Charles Dickens4

I. INTRODUCTION
In two previous articles, I called for government regulation of both assisted
reproduction using frozen sperm after the death of the donor5 and human
cloning.6 Despite the many calls for government regulation of the new
reproductive technologies since those articles appeared, there has been little
legislative reaction.7 Many experts in reproductive law and ethics seem
content (or resigned) to leaving the control of such technologies to doctors and
their individual arrangements with patients.8 Under this view, patients are free
3. Anon., There Was an Old Woman Who Lived in a Shoe, in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY
434 (Iona & Peter Opie eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1952).
4. CHARLES DICKENS, LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF NICHOLAS NICKLEBY 544 (Penguin
Books, 1982).
5. See generally Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem
Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 967, 979 (1996)
[hereinafter Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent].
6. See generally Ronald Chester, To Be, Be, Be Not Just to Be: Legal and Social
Implications of Cloning for Human Reproduction, 49 FLA. L. REV. 303, 311 (1997) [hereinafter
Chester, Cloning for Human Reproduction].
7. See, e.g., Keith Alan Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: A Growing Need for
Consumer-Oriented Regulation of the In Vitro Fertilization Industry, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 265, 299312 (1997) (in which the author proposes various forms of in vitro fertilization regulation,
including requiring statistical honesty, licensing clinics, controlling the quality of IVF services,
and demanding the safekeeping of embryos); Judith F. Daar, Selective Reduction of Multiple
Pregnancy: Lifeboat Ethics in the Womb, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 773, 791 (1992) (“to date there
are no federal regulations governing the clinical practice of infertility therapy.”); Heidi Forster,
The Legal and Ethical Debate Surrounding the Storage and Destruction of Frozen Human
Embryos: A Reaction to the Mass Disposal in Britian and the Lack of Law in the United States,
76 WASH. U. L.Q. 759, 772-74 (1998) (discussing the lack of regulation and need for appropriate
legislation over the disposal of frozen embryos); Lori B. Andrews, The Sperminator, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 28, 1999, at 65 (a New York Bill banning posthumous sperm collection unless the man has
previously consented to the procedure in writing is presently before the legislative assembly,
Assembly Bill 8043, April 26, 1999); Marie McCullough, Fertility Clinics Eyed After Error,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 1999, at A3 (the case of a medical mix-up that left a white New York
couple with twin sons— one white, one black— spawned questions about quality-control
procedures in the baby-making industry and calls for greater regulation.); Jeff Israely, Italy Set to
Pass Fertility Services Law, But Strictures Criticized, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1999, at A25.
8. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 64. See generally Judith F. Daar, Regulating
Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger? 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 633-37 (1997)
OF NURSERY RHYMES
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to contract for reproductive assistance. Should legal problems arise, courts are
left to fashion decisions from common law principles, with little legislative
guidance.9
The dearth of statutory regulation of the new reproductive technologies led
me to consider how common law and other approaches in fact or could work in
different areas of assisted reproduction. Two problems in reproductive
medicine have lately drawn my interest: unconsented sperm harvesting from
dead or comatose males and multiple pregnancies caused by fertility drugs.
Since systematic governmental regulation of such problems seems increasingly
unlikely, I wondered whether the common law and other approaches could
handle these situations and, if so, in what ways.
In this article, I first deal with non-statutory methods of addressing
unconsented sperm harvesting and then use much the same method to deal
with drug-induced multiple pregnancies. After summarizing the various
methods and discussing to what degree I think each would work, I conclude
that common law actions for damages have some chance of succeeding with
regard to drug-induced multiple pregnancies, but that injunctions seem the best
way available to control unconsented sperm harvesting.
II. UNCONSENTED SPERM HARVESTING
A.

The Problem In General

I begin with the proposition, basic to classical contract law, that competent
adults are free to enter into any bargains they choose, provided that these
bargains do not contravene public policy.10 It apparently does not contravene
public policy for an individual to seek to reproduce with most, if not all,
technological aids. In fact, that individual may have a constitutional right to do
so.11 Therefore, reproductive bargains, at least those of patient with fertility or
other doctor, seem permissible on their face.

(discussing the legal, ethical, and policy implications of assisted reproductive technologies
(“ART”)); Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:
An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 324-25 (1990) (the author
proposes that legal rules governing the importance and the legitimacy of individual efforts to
protect intentions and decisions into the future); Sandra Anderson Garcia, Sociocultural and
Legal Implications of Creating and Sustaining Life Through Biomedical Technology, 17 J. LEGAL
MED. 469, 525 (1996).
9. See Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent, supra note 5, at 974-76; Chester, Cloning for
Human Reproduction, supra note 6, at 330-31.
10. See, e.g., Ronald Chester & Scott E. Alumbaugh, Functionalizing First-Year Legal
Education: Toward a New Pedagogical Jurisprudence, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 29-30 (1991).
11. See John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L. J. 1027, 1044-45 (1994).
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Obviously, a comatose or dead man cannot enter into a contract.12 A
doctor may, however, act at the insistence of a third party, who wants the
sperm (which some cases have called a type of “quasi-property”)13 for her own
benefit. If the man has left no instructions or will transferring the rights to his
sperm to the woman involved, she would appear to have no legal right to the
sperm. Nevertheless, doctors can, and often do, harvest the man’s sperm for
the woman’s procreative purposes.14 In the absence of a civil claimant, the
doctor can do so without fear of either sanction or liability.15 While hospitals,
fearful of litigation, generally demand a court order to refuse to treat or to
terminate treatment, they do not appear similarly concerned by sperm
harvesting.16
As Lori Andrews reports: “Our unregulated approach contrasts greatly
with the system in England, where the Human Fertilization and Embryology
Authority, a Government agency, passes judgment on which fertility
techniques are beyond the pale.”17 This agency has prohibited both human
cloning and the use of a dead man’s sperm without his prior consent. We have
no such agency in the United States.18
To change this situation, a recent bill to prohibit the practice has been
introduced in the New York State legislature.19 Whether it will pass and be
12. However, if a man consents in advance to having his sperm harvested at his death, the
male may have made an enforceable third party beneficiary contract with the doctor in favor of
his intended female beneficiary. To be sure of enforceability, such a contract should be in writing
to avoid the Statute of Frauds prohibition in many states on contracts not to be performed until
after death. In states without the applicable Statute of Frauds prohibition, a writing is also
advisable to show to the attending physician. Although such a situation would be rare, one
should also be used where the male intends to allow the harvesting to be done while he is merely
comatose.
13. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
wife has a protected interest in her dead husband’s corneas); Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 308
(5th Cir. 1989) (a “quasi-property” right of survivors in the remains of their deceased relatives);
Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) (under Arkansas law, the next of kin has a
quasi-property right in a dead body); See also James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for
Resolving the Issues Raised by the Interaction Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of
Inheritance, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 763 (1998) (arguing that common law has increasingly
begun to recognize quasi-property rights in the deceased’s body).
14. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 63.
15. See id. at 65.
16. See id. The U.S. Supreme Court held that comatose individuals cannot be forced to
accept life-sustaining treatments. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284
(1990). Andrews argues that “[n]either should they be forced to contribute to life-creating ones.”
Andrews, supra note 7, at 65.
17. Andrews supra note 7, at 64.
18. See id.
19. In January, State Senator Roy Goodman introduced a bill, now pending in the New York
Legislature, that prohibits postmortem retrieval of sperm for reproduction purposes from a
deceased man unless the decedent gave explicit written consent thereto before his death and
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signed into law, and if it is, whether it will be copied by other states, are open
questions. In addition to political difficulties, there may be constitutional
problems with such statutes. The woman involved may claim that her right to
procreate can only be abridged if there is a compelling state interest in such
regulation.20 It may be easier to overcome this problem in the case where the
man is alive and has countervailing privacy, and perhaps property, rights of his
own. Once dead he would seemingly have no such countervailing rights. Still,
one might argue that although the woman might have procreative rights, she
has no right to procreate with the sperm of this particular man in either of the
described situations.21
A good hypothetical case that raises the various issues in unconsented
sperm harvesting would involve the second wife of a dead or comatose
husband who wanted the sperm so she could have the couple’s only child.
Pitted against her interests in creating a child and potential heir of the dead
man might be those of existing children from the man’s prior marriage. It
would be well to keep this paradigm in mind during the discussion that
follows.
B.

Self-Regulation By The Profession

Can we look to the medical profession for self-regulation of sperm
harvesting? It is true, for example, that the American Society of Reproductive
Medicine has developed a protocol entitled “Posthumous Reproduction”22 that
unless the procedure is requested by his partner or spouse. See A.B. 8043, 222nd Leg., 1st Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 1999).
20. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 1044-45 (concluding that the right of women to
conceive artificially includes the right to choose a donor, including a donor who is now dead).
21. But see Susan Kerr, Post Mortem Spem Procurement: Is It Legal? 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 39 (1999). Ms. Kerr states “it is legal to procure sperm from a dead man and use it for
reproductive purposes.” In general, the reasoning to support her argument is unconvincing. For
an example, see the bottom of page 47 where Kerr states that since a fetus is not a person for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment [Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 834 (5th Cir.
1979)], then neither should a corpse be because it has “no potential for life.” Surely Kerr would
concede however, that sperm found within the male corpse has this “potential for life.”
On page 48, Kerr lists a number of cases in which causes of action involving interference
with a dead body were brought by spouses or next of kin; this list would seem to indicate that it is
not legal to intrude into a corpse. Her explanation that “if the corpse were an entity capable of
possessing rights, the action would belong to him or to his personal representative” is arguable,
although it is neither necessarily true, nor dispositive. Whatever the theory, for standing or
recovery, the law’s distaste for such interference is plain.
On page 58, Kerr, without providing any case law to support her claim, states that
“sperm has not been held to be legally willable.” In apparent contrast on page 55 she states that
“the issue in Hecht [Hecht v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836 (Ct. App.
1993)] was whether the sperm is considered property and, therefore, permissibly willable.” Also
arguably inconsistent is her statement on page 60 that “some courts recognize a right of a person
to dispose of his own body in his will.”
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attempts to address the problem. But as Lori Andrews reports, “doctors do not
need to request permission from an ethics committee to undertake the
harvesting procedure. Physicians can make their own ad hoc decisions for
determining which requests should be honored.”23 For example, Dr. Cappy
Rothman, a co-owner of the California Cryobank, has been performing the
procedure since 1978, and has decided not to collect sperm from men who
have had vasectomies.24 His assumption is that these men clearly did not want
children.25
When a Midwest teaching hospital consulted Andrews regarding six men
in comas whose wives, girlfriends, or parents wanted their sperm, she
recommended that the hospital not electroejaculate these men.26 Since no law
or regulation actually prohibited the procedure, the hospital went ahead
anyway.27 This example points out a reality about doctors: they are primarily
in the business of trying to please patients and their relatives. If legislators or
others concerned with larger societal issues do not prohibit a requested
procedure, most doctors will eventually bend to the requests of those paying
their bills, unless a genuine legal threat looms as in the case of termination of
life support. Competition between fertility doctors and their refusal to endure
the oversight of physicians in other specialties on hospital review committees
further hinders effective self-regulation by the medical profession.28
C.

Tort

An eager district attorney might charge a doctor who removed sperm with
an unconsented battery29 (in the case of a comatose man) or “mutilation” of a
dead body,30 but this is highly unlikely, unless a particular district attorney is
interested in making a moral or legal issue of unconsented sperm harvesting. I

Finally, on page 68 Kerr draws a conclusion with which many may differ: “post mortem
sperm procurement” is “simply a minimally intrusive invasilve medical procedure.” For a brief
explaination of this procedure, see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
22. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 61; see also Michelle L. Brenwald & Kay Redeker, A
Primer on Posthumous Conception and Related Issues of Assisted Reproduction, 38 WASHBURN
L.J. 599, 605 (1999).
23. Andrews, supra note 7, at 64.
24. See id. at 63.
25. See id. at 64.
26. See id. at 65. Andrews considers the idea of procreation without permission “a radical
one.” Id. at 62. She believes that “collecting sperm from comatose or dead men is perilously
close to rape.” Id. at 65.
27. See id. at 65.
28. Interview with Dr. Mihai Dimanesceau, Neurosurgeon of Freeport, New York in
Lincoln, Mass. (Dec. 31, 1998). Dr. Dimanesceau has chaired a number of these review
committees.
29. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1.
30. See, e.g., 22 AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 58 (1988).
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assume, however, that most district attorneys have plenty of rapes, robberies,
and killings to prosecute without looking for unusual cases like these. Still,
such a battery could conceivably lead to liability in tort. As the court stated in
Cohen v. Smith, “protecting personal integrity has always been viewed as an
important basis [for the tort of] battery.”31 Furthermore, a person’s right to
refuse medical care is not to be interfered with lightly. As Justice Cardozo
stated, “‘ . . . a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s
consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages.’”32
Who would bring such an action for battery? If a comatose man has
children, presumably one or more of them could petition to become guardian,
or the court might even appoint a third party guardian (of the sperm) as a
neutral between the children and the woman desiring the sperm. The guardian
could then bring the civil action, but damages for the comatose man would
seem to be minor or nonexistent.33 However, if the children could establish the
tort of battery against their father, they might then have an action for tortious
interference with an expectancy of inheritance.34 This would depend on
whether the law would consider the child produced through the sperm both a
child and an heir of their father (once dead).35 There are a number of “ifs” in
this equation. Under current law, however, if the child were conceived after
the death of the man, it would probably be considered either a child but not an
heir, or not a child of the dead man at all.36
If the children would have no action for tortious interference with their
inheritance, could they still have one for the doctor’s infliction of emotional
distress? If the father was merely comatose, the use of machines to force
ejaculation electrically might be highly disturbing to any children watching.
An instrument resembling a cattle prod is inserted into the man’s rectum.37 An
electric shock then causes involuntary ejaculation.38 If the father was already
dead, the children or any relative or friend present would likely see the sperm
being removed surgically,39 which could also be upsetting.
It is unlikely, however, that children or others emotionally close to the
father will be present, or within the tort laws’s “zone of harm,” particularly if
their father is already dead. Still, the California case of Christensen v.

31. 648 N.E.2d 329, 332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
32. Id. at 335 (citing Schloendorf v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (1914)).
33. Also, the holder of a durable power of attorney for health care would presumably have
standing if so authorized by the granting instrument. Cf. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M.
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 403-04 (5th ed. 1995).
34. See id. at 204 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 744 B (1979)).
35. See Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent, supra note 5, at 987-93.
36. See, e.g., id. at 989-90.
37. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 62.
38. See id.
39. See id.
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Superior Court,40 may give them a cause of action. This case involved a
mortuary where, instead of performing dignified burials and cremations as they
were supposed to, workers mutilated the cadavers to procure organs to sell.41
The court held that the mortuary had assumed a duty to close relatives who
later found out about the practice, even though they were not present at the
mutilation.42
Ironically, the plaintiffs would want to prove only negligent infliction of
emotional distress,43 rather than intentional infliction of such emotional harm,
because the doctors’ and hospitals’ insurance policies would probably not
cover intentional infliction of emotional distress. Under Christensen, a claim
for emotional distress would probably lie regardless of whether the man was
alive when the sperm was harvested. Mistreatment of a person’s body, unless
done with concern for close relatives, can cause compensable emotional
distress.44
Since the level of intrusion into or mutilation of comatose or dead bodies
in sperm harvesting does not appear to reach the extremes found in the
Christensen case, the emotional shock upon learning of the procedures would
seem to create only a moderate level of emotional distress. Thus, damages, if
available at all, would probably not be great.
There is at least one other possible tort in this situation. One might start
with the proposition that sperm is a sort of property.45 Certainly it has value
and is regularly exchanged for money in the case of sperm “donors.” If a man
can contract for its use or, as in Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles
County,46 will it or give it away at death, then taking it without the owner’s
consent would seem to be conversion of that property.47
40. See generally Christensen v. Superior Ct., 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).
41. See id. at 185-86.
42. See id. at 196, 200-01.
43. For a discussion of a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress see
Jill Trachtenberg, Living in Fear: Recovering Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Damages
Based on the Fear of Contracting Aids, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 529, 530-33 (1999).
44. See Christensen, 820 P.2d at 197. The court held that it is foreseeable that close
relatives, who are aware that funeral related services are to be undertaken but who are not present
to watch the manner in which the remains are to be prepared for burial or cremation, may suffer
serious emotional distress on learning that the decedent’s remains have been mistreated. Id.
45. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 13, at 762-63. See also Erik S. Jaffe, “She’s Got Bette
Davis(‘s) Eyes”: Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings
and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528 (1990) (arguing that property rights do exist in
the human body and its constituent parts).
46. 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
47. Conversion is defined as “an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of
ownership over . . . personal chattels belonging to another.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (6th
ed. 1990). See also DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 53-55 (3d ed. 1997); Roy
Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial
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Conversion applies to the theft of a chattel, that is, to theft of physical
property. An exhaustive study by Professor Steven Bailey concludes not only
that sperm is different in kind than blood, tissue and organs, but that, when the
question has been presented, sperm has generally been treated by the courts as
property, although they may not admit to doing so.48 The guardian or agent of
a comatose man or heirs of a deceased man would arguably have an ownership
interest in the sperm and thus a cause of action against the doctor and the
woman for stealing the sperm.49 Damages seem uncertain or nominal, but
assumedly an action for replevin of sperm, or an injunction against its use
would lie. Although such an action for conversion might well come too late to
stop the retrieval of the sperm, it could generally be brought in time to prevent
the sperm’s use.
D. Contract
Contracts with doctors are generally actionable at common law only if the
doctor contracts with the patient to achieve a particular result.50 For example,
in Sullivan v. O’Connor, a promise to perform plastic surgery, and thereby
improve the plaintiff’s appearance, was found to be actionable.51 The problem
in the present situation is that the comatose or dead man made no contract with
the doctor regarding the use of his sperm. He may, however, have previously
contracted for a particular operation that proved unsuccessful. A breach of
contract can be found only if the surgeon made an express or implied promise
to avoid harvesting organs, or in this case, special tissue called sperm. If an
organ donation directive has not been signed by the man, the surgeon might be
held to an implied promise not to harvest reproductive tissue. The surgeon
could then be sued by the man’s representative for breaking that promise. The
organ donation directive may not itself expressly cover harvesting of
reproductive tissue like sperm.52
Reproductive tissue is different from other tissue or organs because of its
potential for creating new life. One might want his organs harvested in case of
Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207 (1986) (discussing the rights individuals have in
the commercial exploitation of his or her own body).
48. See Bailey, supra note 13, at 763.
49. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
50. See Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Mass. 1973).
51. Id. at 184-86.
52. See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, §1, 8A U.L.A. 29 (1993). Subsection (7) of
Section 1 defines [body] part to include “an organ, tissue, eye, bone, artery, blood, fluid, or other
portion of the human body.” Although sperm is arguably a form of ‘fluid’ from the human body,
sperm is unlike other fluids because of its capacity to procreate new life and thus it should not be
covered by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act. See discussion infra note 156 and accompanying
text. For an opposing argument, see Kerr, supra note 21, at 63-64, in which Ms. Kerr
recommends an amendment to the Uniform Act allowing procurement of sperm for reproductive
purposes.
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death in order to help others, but he may not want his sperm taken to create
new offspring, and conceivably, new heirs. Not only does a man have a
protectible expectation that a surgeon not use his sperm in such a way without
his consent, but society would seem to have an interest in not allowing the
possible creation of offspring or heirs that the individual did not intend to be
born.
If we follow the Social Security Administration’s ultimate ruling that the
posthumously conceived Judith Hart was entitled to benefits as a child of her
dead father, then such a child could be considered an heir.53 This result may
upset the estate plan of the father, or if no plan existed, the justifiable
expectations of living heirs. If the posthumously conceived child were, by
contrast, viewed in the traditional manner as not being the child of the father,
then the father would not be liable for the child’s support.54 In this case, the
posthumously conceived offspring could become a financial problem for the
state.
E.

The Fiduciary Relationship And Unjust Enrichment

Another line of attack on unconsented sperm harvesting may be found in
the law of confidential or fiduciary relationships. A doctor is in a confidential
relationship with his patient, including one who is comatose.55 Is this
relationship sufficient to create a fiduciary duty that is breached by the
extraction of a kind of property, the patient’s sperm, and the unconsented
transfer of that sperm to others?
In the case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California, the
California Supreme Court found that spleen cells extracted by a physician for
his own profit did not constitute property.56 However, the court said the

53. See Stipulation of Dismissal, Shalala (No. 94-3944) (dismissal dated Mar. 18, 1996). A
statement by Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, explained
the settlement:
In the interim, after consulting with the Department of Justice, we [Social Security
Administration] believe it would be inappropriate to deny benefit payments to Judith Hart
at this time. As a mother two times, I admire the deep feelings of love that brought Judith
Hart into this world and I applaud the miracles of modern medicine that resulted in her
birth.
Therefore, I have asked the Court to return the case to Social Security at which point I
will order the immediate payment of benefits to Judith Hart.
News Release, Social Security Administration, Mar. 11, 1996; see also Benefits Awarded to In
Vitro Child, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at A8 (reporting that the Social Security Administration
agreed to grant benefits to Judith Hart, therefore eliminating the need for continued litigation);
Melissa M. Perry, Fragmented Bodies, Legal Privilege, and Commodification in Science and
Medicine, 51 ME. L. REV. 169, 184-93 (1999).
54. See generally Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent, supra note 5, at 1012-25.
55. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488-90 (Cal. banc 1990).
56. Id. at 489.
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patient had a right of informed consent in this situation and pointed to the
fiduciary duty that would apply to the doctor in the use of these cells.57
Similarly, when a physician extracts a patient’s sperm, damages might be
assessed against the doctor in tort for either breaching his duty to procure
informed consent, or more broadly for breach of his fiduciary duty to the
patient.
Who would enforce such rights? If the man remained alive, a guardian or
holder of a durable power of attorney for health care could sue if so authorized;
if the man was dead, the personal representative of his estate could sue.58 If
the person wanting the sperm were the man’s wife, who might well be the
lifetime representative or executor, she clearly would not bring the action.
Although children of the couple or from a prior marriage, or their guardian ad
litem might force the wife to resign due to a conflict of interest, this supposes
that the children or guardian are cognizant of the threat to their interests as
heirs and existing family members. If the man is merely comatose, there may
also be an action available to these individuals for either violation of the man’s
privacy rights, or for battery. If the personal representative were someone
other than the wife or girlfriend, she would still need to understand the cause of
action in order to bring it.
Even if the doctor were found not to have breached a fiduciary duty, might
his actions have unjustly enriched others? If a new heir was born as a result of
sperm harvesting, and was to take a share under wills law, could the theory of
unjust enrichment be used to force the new child to hold this share in
constructive trust for the previous children? Under such a theory, the doctor
could be viewed as unjustly appropriating the sperm –that is, doing something
that the man did not consent to in his contract. The problem is that the doctor
is not the one unjustly enriched, but instead it is the woman or her child.
Furthermore, the enrichment is not in the form of property appropriated, but
“quasi-property”59 that has the potential to interfere with the existing children’s
inheritance. The possibilities of such an action succeeding seems too remote
for further consideration.
F.

Tentative Conclusions On Sperm Harvesting

In general, large sums of money are not involved in any of the causes of
action discussed above. One exception includes the cases in which existing
heirs are deprived of their expected inheritances because a posthumouslyconceived child is allowed to share decedent’s wealth. A second exception
arises when relatives assert a cause of action for emotional distress. Recovery
based on emotional distress will depend on a court’s willingness to apply the
57. Id. at 485.
58. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
59. See Bailey, supra note 13, at 762-63.
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reasoning in Christensen. Even if a court were willing to do this, the damages
might not be large.
An alternative to a suit for damages would be an action for an injunction
based on a combination of one or more of the causes of action mentioned
above. The extraction of sperm would probably occur before a plaintiff was
able to stop it, so the injunction would most likely be against the use of the
extracted sperm for procreative purposes. If the sperm were considered
property, the suit could also be styled as an action in replevin.60
III. MULTIPLE PREGNANCIES CAUSED BY FERTILITY DRUGS ALONE OR IN
CONJUNCTION WITH IVF
A.

The Problem In General

The failure of medical self-regulation in the area of unconsented sperm
harvesting has also been present in cases of drug-induced multiple pregnancies.
This costly medical nightmare has not been stopped by government legislation
or regulation.
A recent case to receive wide media attention was that of Nkem Chukwu,
who gave birth to octuplets in Houston, Texas in December 1998.61 The
largest of these children weighed only twenty-six ounces. The smallest baby,
who was fifteen weeks premature, weighed only 10.3 ounces, and was 9¾
inches long. This child died not long after birth. Nkem had undergone
aggressive drug therapy to stimulate ovulation. Early in her pregnancy, she
declined to undergo selective reduction62 “of the fertilized eggs, which might
have given the remaining embryos a better chance of meaningful survival.”63

60. Replevin is defined as “an action whereby the owner or person entitled to repossession
of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels from one who wrongfully detains such
goods or chattels.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (6th ed. 1990). For an argument that sperm
would be considered property, and therefore a chattel, see Bailey, supra note 13, at 813-15.
61. See Rick Lyman, As Octuplets Remain in Peril, Ethics Questions are Raised, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1998, at A1. See generally Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia,
Contradiction and the New Reproductive Technologies, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 473 (1996) (reporting
on the American myths of family and children and the effects reproductive technologies have had
on these myths); Laura Meckler, Fertility Drugs Fuel Multiple Baby Boom, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 16, 1999, at A25. (reporting that more than 104,000 babies were born with at least one
sibling in 1997, a 52% increase in twins).
62. Selective reduction is the process by which the number of fetuses carried by the woman
is reduced. The process involves inserting a needle through the woman’s abdomen into one of
the gestational sacs where it is then maneuvered into the fetal chest and potassium chloride is
injected. See Daar, supra note 7, at 779-80. Selective reduction may be performed because there
are more fetuses than can be safely brought to term or because one or more have been found to be
at risk for a disability. Compare Christine Overall, Selective Termination in Pregnancy and
Women’s Reproductive Autonomy, in ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 145-59 (Helen
Bequaert Holmes ed., New York Univ. Press, 1994), with Mary Anne Warren, Abortion: New
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The cost of caring for the pregnancy and the post-birth difficulties of the
seven surviving Chukwu children will run into the millions of dollars.64 The
risk of lifelong health problems and death for these infants is so high that Dr.
Mark Perloe of the Atlanta Reproductive Health Center called their birth “a
wake-up call for the profession.”65 Commenting on the Chukwu births, Alan
Copperman of Mt. Sinai Medical Center said “the vast majority of these cases
end in disaster, sometimes for the mom, most often for the babies.”66 Dr. Mark
Evans of Wayne State University said that “although these babies were born
alive, the odds are that there will not be happy outcomes for at least some of
them.”67 Thus, experienced medical professionals view the Chukwu births not
as cause for great celebration, as did some of the mainstream media, but as a
disaster.68
In 1997, Bobbi McCaughey, still in her twenties, gave birth to septuplets.
John Leo, a columnist for U.S. News and World Report, stated:
Th[e] doctor, Katherine Hauser, certainly can be second-guessed for
overseeing a pregnancy begun when Bobbi McCaughey’s ovaries contained at
least seven mature eggs. The drug Metrodin stimulates egg production, but
those eggs can be counted through ultrasound, and doctors usually advise a
couple to abstain from sex until the next cycle if the egg count is high. Instead
of explaining what she did and why, Hauser opted for an irrelevant argument
based on rights, testily asking reporters, “Should we as a society dictate to
individuals the size of their families or their choices of reproductive care?”
Answer: No. But doctors ought to be able to count to seven, and when
counseling a couple, they have a moral obligation to explain the predicament
and awful options that confront a woman who is carrying seven fetuses.69

In addition to the health risks posed to infants, 70 the carrying of so many
fetuses poses a threat to the mother’s health. As Leo points out, “[i]f Bobbi
Complexities, in ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 113-21 (Helen Bequaert Holmes ed.,
N.Y. Univ. Press, 1994.).
63. See Lyman, supra note 61, at A18.
64. Id. at A1.
65. Id.
66. Id. at A18.
67. Id. However, for an article claiming that the seven remaining Chukwu infants are doing
well thus far, see Last Texas Octuplet Now at Home, CINCINNATI POST, June 26, 1999, at 16A.
68. See, e.g., Dave Goldfinger, 7 Wonders of the Modern World, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept.
30, 1999, at 32.
69. See John Leo, A New Medical Skill: Counting, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 8,
1997, at 20.
70. On November 19, 1999, the septuplets—Kenny, Brandon, Joel, Nathan, Alexis, Kelsey
and Natalie—turned two. Of the seven children, four suffer from some sort of adverse physical
condition. Two of the children have cerebral palsy and must use walkers: Alexis has hypotonic
quadriplegia which causes muscular weakness in all four limbs, and Nathan has spastic diplegia
which causes uncontrollable muscle tightening in his legs. Nathan’s lower body and leg muscles
have been rigid since birth and Alexis has little strength in her trunk and cannot walk or sit up
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McCaughey had been in her late 30s or early 40s, like the typical woman
seeking treatment, she might not have survived the seven births. Even in their
20s, women carrying multiple fetuses are at risk for fatal blood clots and other
complications.”71
What induces doctors to recommend aggressive drug therapies? Leo again
puts it well:
The fact that the fertility business is a rapidly expanding $4 billion industry
plays a role . . . . The industry is by and large for-profit and unregulated.
Competitiveness and all the talk about “market forces” meeting “consumer
demand” set the stage for overly aggressive treatment and quick results that
can be advertised and used against competitors in the pursuit of more
customers. Some sales pitches come with money-back guarantees. In this
overheated commercial climate, many are skeptical that those doing the selling
encourage the customers to think things through. Like all industries, the
fertility business inevitably feels pressure to skip all the fuss about ethics and
just give the customer what she wants.72

Like Nkem Chukwu, the McCaugheys apparently had moral objections to
“fetal reduction.” This made the dangers to the mother and infants inevitable.
Ultimately, these objections cost the McCaugheys “one million dollars in
medical costs to bring the septuplets through infancy.”73
Generally, the possibility of multi-fetal reduction should be discussed with
a patient like Ms. Chukwu before administration of fertility drugs. The doctor
can then decide how aggressive to be with the drug therapy based on whether
fetal reduction will later be permitted. In Ms. Chukwu’s case, the doctor
evidently entered into an aggressive drug program before knowing whether the
patient would agree to the reduction procedure if too many fetuses proved
viable.74
This apparent failure of the medical profession to timely disclose the risks
of drug therapy may be related to a general problem with the use of
reproductive drugs. Under pressure from anti-abortion groups, the United

without help. Recent scans revealed that both children have underdeveloped brain areas. Alexis
also suffers from digestive problems and both she and her sister, Natalie, have to rely primarily
on feedings of high-calorie formula through tubes in their stomachs. A fourth child, Joel, has a
condition which causes one of his eyes to drift and cross. See, e.g., 3 Iowa Septuplets Battling
Serious Health Problems, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 1999 at A11. See also Becky Bohrer,
McCaughy Septuplets Turn 2 Today, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 19, 1999, at A9.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 21.
73. Id. at 20. See also Daar, supra note 7, at 775. The lawsuit in the Frustaci case was
settled for a reported sum of $6.2 million almost six years after Patti Frustaci filed a malpractice
and wrongful death lawsuit against the fertility specialist and the fertility medical center involved
in her treatment. Id. at 775-83.
74. See Lyman, supra note 61, at A18.
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States government has failed to allocate money for reproductive research.75
Thus, the medical profession is not entirely clear on what the proper dosages
and uses of these fertility drugs are.76 In addition, a gynecologist with only
four weeks training during residency has as much access to the drugs as an
experienced practitioner.77 This lack of knowledge and lack of self-regulation
is present even though the demands for children from aging, childless couples,
keep increasing.78
In slightly under ten percent of cases resulting in drug-induced multiple
pregnancies, in vitro fertilization is used.79 Unlike the situation with Ms.
Chukwu, this procedure gives the fertility doctor considerably more control
over multiple births, since he or she can decide the number of eggs to be
implanted. Still, there is pressure from infertile couples, even those who have
not agreed in advance to selective reduction, to implant more, rather than fewer
fertilized eggs to increase chances of success.
Of course there is the further question of whether selective reduction, even
if chosen, is ethical and should be performed at all. Some patients and doctors
consider it an unethical form of early abortion, despite the fact that it is legal
under Roe v. Wade.80 Usually, those embryos easiest to reach in the mother’s
womb are injected with fatal doses of potassium chloride.81 This lottery,
which leaves to pure chance who shall have a chance at life and who shall not,
is morally troublesome, but perhaps less so than culling out the “weakest”
embryos.82 On the other hand, advocates of the procedure differentiate it from
abortion, arguing that while abortion seeks merely to destroy life (or potential
life), selective reduction seeks to increase the chance for life for those embryos
not killed, by elimination of the others.83

75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at A1.
79. See Lyman, supra note 61, at A18.
80. See Daar, supra note 7, at 780.
81. See id. at 780-81; see also Geoffrey Cowley & Karen Springen, More is not Merrier:
When Fertility Drugs Work Too Well, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26, 1996, at 49 (reporting case of Mandy
Allwood, a 31 year old British woman who conceived eight babies using the fertility drug
Metrodin); Leo, supra note 69, at 21 (Dr. Mark Evans, the Wayne State University obstetrician
who pioneered the procedure of selective reduction, recently told one couple, “We don’t see
anything obviously wrong with any of them, so we’re just debating which one is easiest to get
to”).
82. Cf. Daar, supra note 7, at 781 (noting that doctors will sometimes first eliminate fetuses
with gross abnormalities).
83. See id. at 783. Daar calls selective reduction “[A] lifeboat in the womb in which some
must die for the others to live.” Id. at 784; see also Leo, supra note 69, at 21 (Arthur Caplan,
director of Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania said, “you can make a moral case to end
lives in order to rescue lives”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

466

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:451

In England, the multiple-pregnancy problem does not have to be solved
through common law means because there is government regulation. Under
the Voluntary Licensing Authority’s guidelines, English doctors are limited to
implanting a maximum of three embryos.84 There is, however, some evidence
that doctors evade this regulation due to the lack of effective sanctions against
them, particularly where no one wants to complain to the authorities.
If the United States tries to place such a limit on fetal implantation, the law
and/or regulation would likely be struck down as an unconstitutional violation
of a woman’s right to procreate.85 Only if a conservative court decided that
women have a right to procreate only by “natural” means could such a law or
regulation withstand strict scrutiny. Such a decision seems unlikely, however,
because this would appear to create a discriminatory classification: fertile
women would have the constitutional right to procreate, while infertile women
would not.86 With such constitutional problems brewing, politicians, already
frightened of regulating in the explosive reproductive rights area, would most
likely demur. Besides, the emphasis on individualism in this country87 and the
apparent preference to medicalize rather than to legalize such problems,88
encourages legislators to defer to the arrangements made by doctors with
patients.
As with unconsented sperm harvesting from the dead or comatose males,
the multiple-birth conundrum leaves us asking how this procedure can or
should be controlled. Meaningful legislation or administrative regulation
seems unlikely, due to political fears of stirring up the anti-abortion advocates,
general lack of sophistication of legislators, and possible constitutional
problems. As long as the right to procreate is conceived of as extending to
drug-induced pregnancy, the state needs a “compelling state interest” in order
to regulate this procedure.89
B.

Self-Regulation By The Profession

As in the case of unconsented sperm harvesting, self-regulation of the
multiple pregnancy problem by fertility specialists, who are in competition
with each other, seems nearly hopeless. A leading physician who has headed a

84. See Daar, supra note 7, at 791-92 n.83.
85. Compare Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent, supra note 5, at 979-85, with Lawrence
Wu, Family Planning Through Human Cloning: Is there a Fundamental Right? 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 1461 (1998) (presenting and then refuting arguments against affirmative constitutional right
to procreate through assisted reproductive technologies).
86. Cf. Robertson, supra note 11, at 1029.
87. See Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent, supra note 5, at 969-70.
88. See Chester, Cloning for Human Reproduction, supra note 6, at 309.
89. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 1040-41 (stating that if posthumous reproduction is a
fundamental right, a state will have to show a compelling interest before it may interfere with that
right).
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number of medical ethics or review committees has pointed to their
ineffectiveness in regulation.90 Fertility specialists are, for example, unwilling
to accept the verdict of physicians with other specialties, particularly when it
involves their own livelihood.91
The truth is that doctors are more likely to reduce multiple pregnancies by
improving their medical techniques than by regulating themselves. A recent
advance at Stanford Medical School, for example, allows for greater time in
the “petri dish” for the fertilized egg/embryo. Embryos stay in the IVF
program’s specialized culture for five days rather than the usual three.92 This
procedure, which corresponds more closely to nature’s timing, enables doctors
to get a much better “read” on which embryos, when implanted, will produce
successful fetuses.93 With greater understanding of which embryos will be
successful, fewer need to be implanted and the risk of multiple pregnancy is
correspondingly reduced.94
Amin Milki, medical director of Stanford’s IVF and Assisted Reproductive
Technology Lab reports that this new technique has helped patients achieve a
high pregnancy rate “without having to gamble too much with a risk of having
more than twins.”95 The new procedure achieved nearly a 70% pregnancy
success rate for the first 43 women who used it—a rate that compares very
favorably with the slightly less than 30% rate utilizing conventional
techniques.96
C. Can Insurers Control The Multiple Pregnancy Problem?
Since substantial money (and potential damages) are involved in these
multiple-birth situations (unlike the unconsented sperm harvesting cases),
health insurers and HMOs may have a significant role to play in controlling
them. At last count, 12 states mandated that some form of insurance for
fertility treatments at least be offered by insurers.97 The Chukwu infants were
90. See Interview with Dr. Mihai Dimanesceau, supra note 28; see also Andrews, supra note
7 (discussing the difficulty in discouraging doctors from forcibly removing sperm from comatose
patients).
91. Id. (noting that doctors do not need to request permission before undertaking the
procedure and can create their own criteria to determine when the procedure is appropriate).
92. See In Vitro-With Fewer Multiple Births, FARM REPORT NEWS, (Stanford University
Alumni Bulletin), Jan.-Feb.
93. See id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See Blaine LeCesne, Access and Insurance Issues in Pushing Boundaries: An
Interdisciplinary Examination of New Reproductive Technologies, Address at Loyola university
New Orleans School of Law, Symposium, Pushing the Boundaries: An Interdisciplinary
Examination of New Reproductive Technologies, § K (Oct 16/17, 1998) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). Since 1987 Arkansas requires all health insurers, except
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born in Texas, a state that requires certain insurers that cover pregnancy
service to offer coverage for infertility services.98
Presumably this coverage costs extra and was bought by Ms. Chukwu
(whose husband is a respiratory therapist). Massachusetts has an even stronger
law, requiring HMOs and insurance companies that cover pregnancy to cover
medically necessary expenses of infertility diagnosis and treatment (not merely
offer it as an option at increased cost).99
Of course, the majority of states still do not have any statutes requiring
health insurers to do anything about fertility treatments. If patients have no
coverage at all, they will exert extreme pressure on their fertility doctors to
achieve quick results with their expensive treatments. This in turn stimulates
more aggressive drug protocols. However, even in a state such as
Massachusetts that mandates the coverage, problems arise. Tufts Health Plan,
one of Massachusetts’ largest and most successful plans, recently announced
that it was “cutting off” three fertility centers that were not achieving high
enough success rates with their treatments.100 It would seem then that such
pressure from health insurers is counterproductive in reducing multiple
pregnancies. After all, to achieve a higher “success rate,” doctors need only
increase their use and dosage of fertility drugs—more fertilized embryos will
produce higher success rates.
Generally, if pregnancy services are covered by health insurance, so is the
neonatal care of any resulting infants.101 Since the cost of this care in a case

HMOs, that cover maternity benefits to cover IVF; since 1989 California requires that certain
insurers offer coverage for infertility diagnosis and treatment; since 1989 Connecticut requires
that certain insurers offer coverage for infertility diagnosis and treatment; since 1987 Hawaii
requires a one-time benefit for outpatient costs resulting from IVF; since 1991 Illinois requires
that insurance policies that cover more than 25 people to cover the costs of diagnosis and
treatment of infertility; since 1985 Maryland requires that insurance policies that cover pregnancy
cover the cost of IVF; since 1987 Massachusetts requires that HMOs and insurance companies
that cover pregnancy cover medically necessary of infertility diagnosis and treatment. Since 1987
Montana requires that insurers include infertility services as part of basic “health care services.”
Since 1990 New York requires that insurers provide coverage for the “diagnosis and treatment of
correctable medical conditions,” which definition does not encompass IVF. Since 1991 Ohio
requires that HMOs cover basic preventive care, including infertility services. Since 1989 Rhode
Island requires that insurers provide coverage for diagnosis and treatment of infertility, but allows
co-payment up to 20% R.I. Gen. Laws. Since 1987 Texas requires that certain insurers that cover
pregnancy service offer coverage for infertility services. See id.
98. See id.
99. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47H (West 1997).
100. See Richard Saltus, Insurer Drops 3 Fertility Clinics/ Tufts Health Plan Says Facilities
Don’t Meet Criteria, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 1999, at A1.
101. Telephone Interview with John A. Robertson (Oct. 5, 1999). For a discussion of the role
of health insurance in reproductive technologies specifically in vitro fertilization see generally
Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 1215 (1997). See also Comment, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer
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like that of Ms. Chukwu far exceeds the cost of the fertility treatments
themselves, one would think that insurers offering this coverage would want to
deter doctors from using overly aggressive therapies. So far, I have seen no
evidence that this is the case. Highly expensive neonatal care situations like
that of the Chukwu infants should persuade insurers like Tufts not to
encourage “success rates” at any price. Of course, as long as medical oversight
can keep extreme situations like that of the Chukwu infants to a minimum,
insurers will be more concerned with the costs of fertility treatments
themselves than with the relatively rare expenses stemming from post-birth
care of infants from multiple pregnancies.102
If the care of multiple-birth infants is not covered by insurance, couples
like the Chukwus will have to rely on massive publicity by the media to
stimulate donations (as well as payments for their story) in order to pay the
millions of dollars required for their children’s care.103 The more common
multiple births become, however, the less publicity they will generate. Once
couples can no longer rely on the media for help, uninsured couples having
three to seven births will turn to private law and lawyers for aid with their
dilemma.
D. Contract
Contract law is much more directly involved in the multiple pregnancy
problem than in unconsented sperm harvesting. Since the American
government is leaving fertility treatment largely unregulated, one may view an
Protection, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2092 (1996) (suggesting recommendations aimed at promoting
predictability and protecting consumers’ ability to make rational and informed choices about
insurance and about IVF treatment itself).
102. Since insurance usually covers neonatal care no matter how children are conceived,
increased high-order multiple births may cause insurers to begin writing policies limiting their
exposure for neonatal expenses, perhaps by covering expenses only for a set number of births.
See Robertson Interview, supra note 101. Also, it is conceivable that insurers could simply put a
dollar cap on neo-natal expenses from a given pregnancy.
103. See Lawrence K. Altman, Ounce by Ounce, Surviving Octuplets Showing Progress,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 17, 1999, at A14. The doctor for Ms. Chukwu and the head of the
neonatal unit, Dr. Leonard E. Weisman, estimated the total cost for the octuplets at about $2
million. The amount will be covered by the health insurance that the father receives though his
work at a hospital; Leigh Hopper, Multiple Blessings/ Prayers Mark Homecoming of Nos. 4 and
5, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 18, 1999, at 35 (The father stated: “I have insurance, but there are
some things that are not covered. I have to take care of the kids.”); Barbara Whitaker, Sextuplet
Survivors Aren’t in the Limelight, Miss Gifts Other Births, Backlash Seem to Block Aid, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, July 5, 1999, at A6 (reporting that whereas the Chukwus received a 5,300 square foot
home, a tractor-trailor loaded with baby furniture, and all the diapers they needed, the birth of
sextuplets by Chris Ann Collins was overshadowed by the birth of the McCaughey septuplets in
Iowa and the octuplets of Ms. Chukwu. Although insurance covered $2.5 million of the cost of
the births and extended hospital care, the Collinses are now faced with $100,000 in remaining
medical bills).
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agreement for fertility services as merely another contract. However, upon
closer analysis, it becomes clear that we are not dealing with an arm’s-length
bargain between roughly equal parties.
First of all, the patients are often psychologically desperate, viewing the
fertility center as their last hope to help them conceive a child.104 This puts
them in a very weak bargaining position vis-a-vis the medical “experts” who
offer this “one last chance.” Moreover, the patients are confronted by sleek
brochures and professionally prepared videotapes.
Despite my extensive review of the brochures and other materials offered
by the Fertility Center of New England and Reproductive Science
Associates,105 I saw nothing at all about the risks of various infertility
techniques, including multiple births and the option of selective reduction to
prevent them. In general, the picture painted is one of caring professionals
who, with many advanced techniques at their disposal, are almost certain to
produce a successful pregnancy. Whether such a “picture” contains promises
that might be actionable in the case of multiple pregnancy depends on the
specific details of the advertising packet.
The “contract” between fertility doctor/clinic and patient may contain
elements of the center’s advertising, as well as oral assurances and the contents
of any written release authorizing the services decided upon. States cannot
prohibit such reproductive contracts because the constitutional right to
procreate probably extends to the right of a couple, particularly a married one,
to procreate by non-coital means.106 Although the state may regulate the
circumstances under which such contracts are formed, it could not bar or refuse
to enforce such contacts altogether without a “compelling” reason.107
Since such contracts would probably not be prohibited by statute, courts
could not refuse to enforce them on the ground that the subject of the
agreement is “illegal,” as against established public policy.108 The onesidedness of these bargains could, however, give rise to relief for the weaker
party (patient) under doctrines such as unconscionability, which apply to

104. See Leo, supra note 69, at 20.
pamphlets: DIAGNOSING
105. See REPRODUCTIVE SCIENCE CENTER OF BOSTON,
INFERTILITY; CONVENTIONAL INFERTILITY TREATMENTS; ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY PREDICTING SUCCESSFUL IVF; see also Fertility Center of New England, Inc.
(visited Jan. 31, 2000) <http://www.fertilitycenter.com>.
106. See John A. Robertson, Liberalism and the Limits of Procreative Liberty: A Response to
My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 233, 233-34 (1995) [hereinafter Roberson, Procreative
Liberty].
107. See Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, supra note 11, at 1040-41.
108. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 321-68 (3rd ed. 1999) (describing
what types of contracts are “illegal”).
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contracts of adhesion.109 Related actions might be brought under applicable
statutes that cover these patients as consumers.110
Doctors can prevent a court from policing its fertility agreement for
unfairness by making full disclosure of the risks to be undertaken. At the
outset, each patient should be told of the twenty to thirty percent chance of
multiple pregnancy and of the fetal reduction procedure that would be used to
limit the difficulties should a multiple pregnancy occur.111 If these facts are
fully and fairly disclosed, most courts would probably not protect the patients
even if their bargaining position is woefully weak vis a vis the fertility
doctor.112
The starting point of the contractual inquiry is to examine what the doctor
and clinic have promised the patient. Clinics that have made “money-back
guarantees,”113 often to younger patients, have provided partial refunds to
those that undergo several cycles of unsuccessful treatment..114 Of course
“success” may be defined in several ways. Presumably, the patient would be
expecting one fetus to be born alive and well. Some clinics might define
success, however, as merely successful conception. The exact promise would
have to be carefully analyzed.
Assuming that the promise was for a successful birth, would high order
multiple birth be defined as success, blocking the money-back guarantee? One
assumes that the fertility doctors would see the promise this way,115
particularly with the selective reduction procedure available to “cull out”
unlucky supernumerary embryos.
“Success” in this context does not seem to me to include a pregnancy that
results in triplets or more unless the patient was sufficiently warned of the risk
of such a “high-order” multiple birth. If the doctor did not give these timely
warnings and a multiple pregnancy resulted, and then, when told of selective
reduction, the patient declined, the doctor may have breached his promise to
achieve “success.” The next hurdle for the patient/client would of course be
whether her remedy for this “failure” would be limited to the terms of the
109. Id.
110. For example, “baby FTC acts” such as Chapter 93A of the Massachusetts General Laws
apply to unfair and deceptive practices by physicians. Telephone conversation of the author with
Pasqua Scibelli, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts (Oct. 5, 1999). See MASS GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1997); Fitzgerald v. Goldberg, No. 94-6620-E, 1998 WL 77880
(Mass. Super.); Bartels v. Leighton, No. 91233, 1994 WL 879548 (Mass. Super.); Little v.
Rosenthal, 382 N.E.2d 1037 (Mass. 1978).
111. See Cowley & Springen, supra note 81.
112. See Daar, supra note 7, at 840.
113. See Leo, supra note 69, at 20.
114. See Keith Alan Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: A Growing Need for
Consumer-Oriented Regulation of the In Vitro Fertilization Industry. 18 J. LEGAL MED. 265, 287
(1997).
115. See Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (1973).
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money-back guarantee. It seems that it might not be so limited, due to the
elements of adhesion and unconscionability in the contract.
Generally, doctors try to avoid contracting to provide a specific result, such
as one healthy child. Such promises may be actionable in contract if the result
is otherwise than promised.116 Fertility clinics that give money-back
guarantees117 may, however, be promising just such a result. A court or jury
might not limit the remedy to restitution of the amounts paid; they may find
such a limitation of remedy unconscionable due to the adhesive character of
the contract itself or the unequal bargaining power that produced it.
Lawyers generally prefer to subsume any contract claim under a tort
theory, in this case one of simple malpractice or possibly, wrongful
conception.118 The exception is where, as in Sullivan v. O’Connor, the
plaintiff’s attorney thinks there are assurances by the doctor that a specific
result would be achieved.119 If assurances are made in the literature of the
fertility clinic or by its staff that the procedure would result in a normal
pregnancy producing only one child,120 perhaps a contract claim could be
raised. As to damages, the court in Sullivan gave alternatives to restitution
based on the reliance or expectation measures.121 Reliance damages in such a
case could give the patient all that was spent on the children born in excess of
the expected number. Perhaps the mother’s excess suffering would also be
compensable under this measure.
Emotional distress damages might also be awarded for breach of
contract.122 Surely, doctors and fertility clinics could reasonably expect
emotional distress in a patient when a multiple pregnancy occurs. Not only is a
pregnancy involving multiple fetuses more stressful that the norm, but the sight
of her premature and afflicted newborns could be expected to cause severe and
prolonged emotional distress in the mother.
Thus, Sullivan opens a host of possibilities for the plaintiff’s lawyer.
While a tort count in malpractice is the most obvious way to proceed,
negligence may be hard to prove. By contrast, a contract count may be a
straightforward winner if the plaintiff can prove that there were promises and
assurances by the doctor or clinic that the pregnancy, if achieved, would not
produce multiple infants. The trick is to find those assurances. Even if the
assurances did not rise to the level of bargained-for promises, if it was
116. See id.
117. See Leo, supra note 69, at 20.
118. See Shari S. Weinman, Birth Related Torts: Can They Fit the Malpractice Mold?:
Shelton v. Saint Anthony’s Medical Center, 56 MO. L. REV. 175, 179 (1991).
119. See Sullivan, 296 N.E.2d at 184.
120. A ‘normal’ pregnancy would include two children, unlike three and over which is a very
rare occurrence.
121. See Sullivan, 296 N.E.2d at 184.
122. See Lamm v. Shingleton, 55 S.E.2d 810, 814-15 (N.C. 1949).
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reasonable for the patient to rely on them, promissory estoppel might lie, with
the possibility of reliance or expectation damages.123
E.

Tort

At least one major malpractice case brought for a drug-induced multiple
pregnancy has been successfully settled for plaintiffs. On May 21, 1985, Patti
Frustaci, a thirty year old high school teacher from Riverside, California, gave
birth to the first septuplets born in the United States.124 This multiple birth
quickly, and rather predictably, turned tragic. All the infants were born twelve
weeks premature. One infant was stillborn and three others died within weeks
of respiratory failure.125 The four month hospitalization of the surviving three
infants generated over one million dollars in hospital bills.126 According to
Judith Daar, “seven years after their birth, the three children continue to suffer
severe physical and developmental impairment, including cerebral palsy and
serious eye problems.”127
According to Professor Daar, “[s]hortly after their third surviving child
was discharged from the hospital, the Frustacis filed a lawsuit alleging
malpractice and wrongful death against the fertility specialist and the fertility
medical center involved in Mrs. Frustaci’s treatment.”128 The Frustacis alleged
that Mrs. Frustaci was not properly monitored with ultrasound screening to
detect how many eggs were ready for fertilization, following treatment with
the fertility drug Perganol. Almost six years later, the lawsuit was settled and
the fertility center paid the Frustacis 6.2 million dollars.129
Apparently, selective reduction was offered to Mrs. Frustaci early in her
pregnancy, but she rejected it.130 By reducing the number of fetuses from
seven to two or three, Mrs. Frustaci could have optimized her opportunity to
deliver full-term, healthy infants. Daar concludes that the availability of this
procedure should be disclosed to the patient whenever the fertility treatment
involved carries a risk of multiple births; “[t]his disclosure must come early in
the treatment process so that a woman who would reject the procedure, as did

123. See generally FARNSWORTH, supra note 108, at 98-116.
124. See Daar, supra note 7, at 775, 775 n.1. For a discussion of the available tort remedies
for women who have sought medical assistance or counseling services in responding to an
unplanned pregnancy, see generally Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: Enhancing the
Common-Law Protection for Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 489 (1998).
125. Id. at 775.
126. Id. (citing Gary Jarlson, Septuplet Parents Name Doctor, Clinic; Frustacis Sue, Charge
Malpractice, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1985, Part 2 at 1).
127. See id. at 775.
128. Id. at 775 n.4.
129. See Daar, supra note 7, at 775 n.4.
130. See id. at 781.
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Patti Frustaci, can make an informed decision about the course of her
therapy.”131
Just what are women contemplating fertility treatment told about the
option of selective reduction? According to Daar, “there are two schools of
thought [among doctors] on whether a doctor should discuss the procedure at
early stages of therapy—one says yes, the other no. . . .”132 Doctors who do
not make an “up front” disclosure rationalize their behavior (which appears to
have a profit motive) by arguing that such a disclosure would be too upsetting
to a person who is doing everything possible to create life, not destroy it.133
Whatever individual doctors may think, the legal doctrine of informed
consent provides a legal answer to the dilemma. Informed consent protects
the right of the patient to make a knowledgeable decision about her body.
Thus, even where the medical procedure is successful despite the failure of
disclosure, the woman’s right to informed consent is compromised.
The first test for informed consent was announced in 1957 by the
California Court of Appeals in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board
of Trustees:134
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability [in
tort] if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an
intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise the
physician may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure . . . to induce
his patient’s consent.135

This is the patient’s “right to have all information that is material”
standard.136 The majority test, somewhat more difficult from the plaintiff’s
point of view, is the “professional standard.”137 This test does not focus on the
information the patient “needs” to make an informed decision, but on the level
of disclosure practiced by other doctors regarding the procedure in question.138
In the case of a woman contemplating fertility therapy, the Salgo standard
requires the doctor to decide which facts a reasonable woman in the patient’s
position would find material in her decision-making process.139 Once warned
of the possibility of multiple pregnancy, the patient should be told about the
treatment options for multiple pregnancy, including selective reduction. Since
a woman may initially accept or reject a proposed fertility treatment based on
131. Id. at 785.
132. Id. at 839.
133. See id.
134. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
135. Id. at 181.
136. See, e.g., Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995). See also DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra
note 47, at 360.
137. See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 47, at 360.
138. See id.
139. See Daar, supra note 7, at 840.
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the information about possible multiple births, her initial decision in this regard
may also change in light of information about selective reduction. Thus, early
information about selective reduction would be material to her decisionmaking process.
While some doctors purportedly withhold information about selective
reduction for fear that their patients may not wish to contemplate terminating
one or more of their fetuses, these patients have a right to know early on that
such an option exists.140 By analogy, courts have held that under certain
circumstances, physicians are under a duty to disclose the option of abortion to
their patients.141
In Berman v. Allan,142 the parents of a child born with Down’s syndrome
sued the doctor who had treated the mother during pregnancy for failure to
inform her about the availability of amniocentesis. They alleged that had they
known about the procedure the mother would have submitted to it.143 Upon
learning that her child would suffer from Down’s syndrome, she would then
have aborted the fetus.144 The court held that this “loss of her right to abort the
fetus”145 caused compensable harm to the parents under the doctrine of
wrongful birth.146
Thus, if a woman undergoing fertility treatment is not timely told of the
risk of a multiple pregnancy and the necessity of selective reduction to treat it,
she may have a cause of action in tort for wrongful birth in the case of
defective newborns. Causes of action may also lie for wrongful death for any
infants who died, and for wrongful conception for those unwanted children
who survived in reasonable health.147
The wrongful birth suit might compensate the parents of a defective
newborn resulting from multiple pregnancy by awarding the expenses of
ordinary and extraordinary medical care and education of the child, the
expenses and pain and suffering of the mother during pregnancy, and the
emotional distress of the parents.148 By contrast, damages for wrongful
conception or pregnancy149 resulting in relatively normal children could
compensate the mother for her pain and suffering during pregnancy, medical
140. See id. at 841.
141. Id.
142. 404 A.2d 8 (N.J. 1979).
143. See id. at 10.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 14.
146. See id.
147. See Weinman, supra note 118, at 176-79.
148. See id. at 177.
149. Cf. Fred Norton, Assisted Reproduction and the Frustration of Genetic Affinity: Interest,
Injury, and Damages, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 796 (1999) (discussing the interest parents have in
bearing children with whom they share symbolically identifying traits. Norton believes that this
interest is a significant motivation in the decision to use assisted reproductive technology.).
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expenses, and perhaps emotional distress. The husband might also recover for
loss of consortium. Such damages might have to be offset, however, by the
value of having a child in the first place.150
Can the doctors protect themselves from potential lawsuits by fully
informing the fertility patient before therapy begins of both the possibility of
multiple birth151 and of the option of selective reduction to treat the multiple
pregnancy? Several possibilities emerge. If the doctor does not initially
disclose the risk of multiple pregnancy (rare today) then he would not initially
disclose the option of selective reduction. If the patient is only told of the
option of selective reduction during the multiple pregnancy, it would seem
that she could decline it and still have an action for a birth–related tort. If the
risk of multiple pregnancy is initially disclosed, but not the option of selective
reduction, a disclosure of the latter during pregnancy would seem similarly
actionable for the reasons Daar adduced above.152
What if, however, the doctor makes a timely disclosure of both the risk of
multiple-pregnancy and the option of selective reduction? In this case it would
seem that no action would lie, whether or not selective reduction is performed.
Although the fertility clinic may lose business by such frank, up-front
disclosure, they would protect themselves from both tort and contract liability.
F.

The Fiduciary Relationship

In the case of drug-induced multiple pregnancies, any breach of the
physician’s “fiduciary” duty to the woman patient would be the result of
failing to disclose at the outset of treatment both the risks of multiple
pregnancy and the necessity of selective reduction if the treatment were to
produce too many fetuses. While the failure to disclose may cause the patient
financial injury, the doctor is not misappropriating the patient’s expenses.
Thus, the doctor’s duty to his patient seems adequately covered by contract and
tort causes of action. The only legal gain I can see from calling the doctor’s
breach a fiduciary one is that such a breach might be more easily found: it
would not have to involve a specific breach of contract or a neglectful violation
of the standard of care. Since the problem is ultimately one of full disclosure,
the tort theory of informed consent appears to address it. Although Moore v.
Regents of the University of California153 identifies the tort of breach of
fiduciary duty by a doctor toward his patient, that precedent might be limited
to the situation where the doctor misappropriates the patient’s property for

150. See Weinman, supra note 118, at 179; Norton, supra note 149, at 837-39.
151. Twenty to thirty percent of drug induced or drug aided IVF pregnancies result in
multiple pregnancies. See Leo, supra note 69, at 20.
152. See Daar, supra note 7, at 838-43.
153. 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990).
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personal gain.154 However, this mixing of tort and fiduciary law might
arguably be extended to provide a viable cause of action in the multiplepregnancy situation.155
IV. SUMMARY
A.

Unconsented Sperm Harvesting

In cases of unconsented sperm retrieval, the case-by-case common law
approach is not particularly helpful when damages are sought. The first
problem is that the party whose interests are most directly affected—the
comatose or dead man— is not, for obvious reasons, in a position to protect
himself. That leaves his protection in the hands of a guardian or representative
who may in fact be the woman requesting the sperm retrieval. Unless there is
an independent authority to intervene at the hospital when the request is made,
the decision to harvest the sperm will be made at the doctor’s whim. The only
hope would be for such a person to get a court order to somehow prevent
insemination of the woman with the harvested sperm. There would only be
time to obtain this court order if the sperm was to be frozen for future use, but
not if the doctors involved were to perform an insemination immediately after
the retrieval.
Who might want to legally intervene in the sperm harvesting process? The
most likely candidates are the man’s existing children, if any. If the man is
comatose, but not dead, these children face the real risk of having to share their
father’s estate with a newcomer. If the man is dead, there is much less
likelihood that any child would be considered a child and/or heir of the father,
although the Hart case opens up this possibility.156
Under the Hart case, the public may also have to support the infant,
although this would not be a concern motivating the children to intervene
legally. If the outcome in Hart were to become routine, the state might
eventually feel it necessary to intervene to protect the public purse. However,
this would only seem possible via statute or regulations, which most states do
not seem likely to enact because of political pressures.
Assuming that existing children of the man were able to intervene legally
before conception, what would be the gravamen of their complaint? As we
have noted, they may have a potential financial interest as heirs if state law
would declare the child of such harvesting to be an heir of the decedent. If the

154. Id. at 483.
155. A more detailed discussion of the possible use of the cause of action of breach of
fiduciary duty in the multiple-pregnancy situation can be found in the two paragraphs
accompanying note 183, infra.
156. See Hart v. Shalala, No. 94-3944 (E.D. La. Dec. 12, 1993); see also Chester, Freezing
the Heir Apparent, supra note 5, at 988.
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man died intestate, the new child would take the same portion of the estate as
existing children. If the man died testate, the new child might, in some states,
be considered a pretermitted child and take a share.157 These financial interests
might be sufficient to get an injunction against use of the sperm before
insemination, but once the woman is impregnated and the new embryo is
granted “heir” status by state law,158 others would appear incapable of
intervening under wills law.
What about tort law as a more direct way to compensate the children
already born? The Christensen case159 seems to give such children the chance
to show that they suffered from negligently inflicted emotional distress as a
result of the physician’s unconsented battery or mutilation of their father, even
though they may have been kept away from the procedure. One problem is
that the negligent infliction of emotional distress is often not seen as an
independent tort; thus there must be an underlying battery or other tort.160 If
the man were dead, the woman requesting the sperm might well have statutory
authority over the disposition of the cadaver, including its’ parts and tissues.161

157. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 33, at 550-60. Pretermitted child statutes
have been enacted in almost all states and can be classified as either “Missouri” type or
“Massachusetts” type. Under a Missouri type statute, the statute usually is drawn to benefit
children “not named or provided for” in the will. Therefore, it must appear from the will itself that
omission of the child or other heir was intentional. Extrinsic evidence of intent is not admissible.
Under the Massachusetts-type statute, the child takes “unless it appears that such omission was
intentional and not occasioned by any mistake.” Extrinsic evidence is admitted to show both the
presence or absence of intent to disinherit.” Id. at 560.
158. See generally Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent, supra note 5, at 977-93.
159. Christensen v. Superior Ct., 820 P.2d 181 (Cal. 1991).
160. See Trachtenberg, supra note 43, at 530-31.
161. See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 3(a), 8A U.L.A. 40 (1993).
Any member of the following classes of persons, in the order of priority listed,
may make an anatomical gift of all or a part of the decedent’s body for an
authorized purpose, unless the decedent, at the time of death, has made an
unrevoked refusal to make that anatomical gift:
(1) the spouse of the decedent;
(2) an adult son or daughter of the decedent;
(3) either parent of the decedent;
(4) an adult brother or sister of the decedent;
(5) a grandparent of the decedent; and
(6) a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of death.
Under the organ donor law, a wife or other relative can donate the deceased’s organs or
tissue and can choose the recipient. Daar believes it would then follow that the wife could
technically donate the sperm to herself. See Daar, supra note 7, at 65. However, although § 1(7)
of the Act includes in the definition of body “part” not only “tissue”, but “fluid”, the wife, on
closer reading, does not seem to be a permissible donee of the sperm. Under § 6(a)(3) of the Act,
a wife or other woman desiring the sperm for use in procreation does not appear to be someone
needing it “for therapy or transplantation.” UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1987) § 1(7), §
6(a)(3), 8A U.L.A. 30, 53 (1993).
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In the case of a comatose man, this same woman might have the legal authority
to dispose of tissues if such disposal would not be life threatening.162 The
question, however, is whether sperm is similar enough to other tissues to fall
under her authority. I argue, with others,163 that semen is dissimilar to other
tissue because of its’ potential for producing life and should not come under
any such authority.
The same conclusion should hold for tissue cloned for reproductive
purposes, when that technology is perfected.164 Some may disagree, however,
and find the intrusion justifiable, thereby eliminating the underlying tort of
battery or mutilation of the cadaver. Even if the underlying tort were found,
the question of whether the emotional distress from electroejaculation or
simple incision in the man’s body is sufficient to be compensable. All in all,
the children, even under tort, may have a tough time prevailing. Even if they
were awarded minor damages, they would not have succeeded in stopping
either the feared behavior or the problems it may cause them in the future.
Therefore, an injunction, either against the procedure itself or against the use
of the retrieved sperm, is the most useful remedy.
If the underlying tort were not proven, emotional distress damages could
be supported under breach of contract. In Lamm v. Shingleton,165 a widow
who watched her husband’s vault rise above the ground following burial, was
compensated for her severe emotional distress.166 There, however, the party
claiming emotional distress was in privity of contract with the undertaker, who
breached the contract for a proper burial. Here, the children are not parties to
the underlying contract. A suit for emotional damages by the children will lie
only if the breach of any contract, even one not made with the party claiming
emotional harm, is held to support a claim for emotional distress damages.
While this seems plausible, courts are unlikely at this juncture to extend the
existing, narrow exception to the general rule that penal damages are not
allowed in a contract action.167
Due to these difficulties, it is my reluctant conclusion that lawsuits for
damages are probably not the answer to the unconsented sperm harvesting

162. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 33, at 403-04. In most states a durable
power of attorney for health care is provided whereby a person can appoint an agent to make
health care decisions in case of the person’s incompetence. Id.
163. See generally Bailey, supra note 13, at 759-61.
164. See generally Chester, Cloning for Human Reproduction, supra note 6 (addressing
arguments on whether cloned tissue should be treated in the same ways as other tissue).
165. 55 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. 1949).
166. See id. at 813-14.
167. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 108, at 544-45. For general discussions of punitive
damages, see, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further
Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 16 (1998); and A. Mitchel Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 870, 896 (1998).
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problem. In many cases an injunction may be effective if a proper plaintiff can
be found to bring the action in time. Otherwise, the government will have to
develop a compelling interest (perhaps through the necessity of its paying for
these unauthorized children) to have both the will to intervene and the
constitutional authority to do so.
B.

Drug-Induced Multiple Pregnancies

My conclusion is different, however, in the case of drug-induced multiple
pregnancies. There are some real possibilities, particularly for tort lawyers
under traditional malpractice theory or the new tort of wrongful conception,
against a fertility industry with deep pockets.
The consensus of academic opinion appears to be that there is an
affirmative constitutional right to procreate that probably includes the right to
procreate using assisted reproduction technologies.168 Although the Supreme
Court has never specifically held that there is such a right, there is ample
reason to believe it would if the opportunity arose. After all, it is hard to see
procreation as anything other than a fundamental human right. It is not so
clear whether the Supreme Court would, despite the fundamental nature of the
right, hold that the government has an obligation to help persons pay for such
treatment when they cannot afford it.169
The result is probably that anyone paying for fertility services can have
them on whatever basis she and her doctor decide, with very little fear of
government intrusion. Given the proximity of assisted reproduction issues to
those of abortion, it is highly unlikely that legislators are going to find the
“compelling state interest”170 necessary to regulate the fertility industry. In
fact, the most we can probably hope for is disclosure legislation which treats
the fertility patient either as a general consumer or as a special type of one.
Thus, although government regulation is generally preferable to indirect
regulation through the common law because of its power to deal with problems
before they happen, the common law is likely to provide the chief regulatory
mechanism in this area.
We start with the strong bias of an American system that leaves the
complex and emotionally-charged issues of assisted reproduction to private
contract between patient and doctor/fertility center. However, fertility patients
are among the more desperate patients that doctors see. They are willing to put
up with all sorts of invasive, painful, costly and uncertain procedures in hope
of conceiving and delivering a child. This sets the contract model askew, due
to the gross disparity in bargaining power between a fertility doctor and that

168. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 1028-30.
169. See id. at 1042-43.
170. See id. at 1044.
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doctor’s patient. Thus, private contract is not a particularly good way of
regulating fertility matters before a dispute arises.
Fertility doctors will claim that this disparity in bargaining power means
little because self-regulation by the doctors prescribes what services they offer
and how they deliver them. The fact remains, however, that these doctors and
clinics are in competition with one another for patients and that no mandatory
guidelines have been placed on them by any medical group. Thus, market
pressures are always present. If one doctor will not harvest the sperm from a
dead or comatose man at a woman’s request, then another probably will. If
one doctor refuses aggressive drug therapy to overstimulate egg production
during a cycle, then another will probably prescribe it. If one doctor will, after
IVF, implant only three embryos for fear of causing multiple pregnancy,
another may implant nine to increase chances of success. Competition, the
driving engine of capitalism, is hard at work in reproductive medicine. The
result is that medical ethics are constantly under pressure, with quantifiable
“results” usually trumping the ethicists’ pleas for caution.
The health insurance industry is another potential regulator of assisted
reproduction. If the industry will not pay a doctor to harvest sperm from a
dead or comatose man, nor for the freezing of that sperm or implantation of it
in his wife or lover, this will diminish demand for such services. One can
imagine a regime under which such procedures would be covered by insurance
when there is prior written consent of the donor, but not otherwise. But the
problem is that all these procedures are relatively simple and inexpensive.
Sperm retrieval and artificial insemination are straightforward in themselves,
and although freezing of the sperm may be desired, presumably such storage
will be of short duration and at little expense. Thus, the health insurance
industry cannot be counted on for regulation because of the lack of financial
incentives for them to do more.
The health insurance industry may have more to say about drug-induced
multiple pregnancies, with or without the use of IVF. To the extent these
pregnancies become frequent, the costs of hospitalization for mother and
infants becomes a factor for the insurance industry. For now, in states like
Massachusetts where fertility services must be covered,171 the industry appears
to be concentrating on the cost of the treatments themselves. So far their
policing of this end of the problem seems counterproductive. What they
demand from fertility clinics is high success rates.172 This pressures the clinics
to overstimulate egg production to improve these success rates. Not only does

171. See LeCesne, supra note 97.
172. See Saltus, supra note 100, at A1.
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such overstimulation increase the risk of high-order multiple-pregnancies
(three or more children), it puts the mother’s health at risk.173
As long as “success rates” of clinics can stay high enough to satisfy the
health insurance industry without inducing enough high-order multiple
deliveries to concern insurers, insurers will accept the high costs of the
relatively few such deliveries they have to bear. Only if greater use of fertility
drugs increases costs to insurance companies can we expect them to penalize
clinics producing too many multiple pregnancies.
In states that do not mandate or offer coverage of fertility services, the
question arises whether a given policy would cover pregnancy and neonatal
expenses resulting from assisted reproduction. Although most do, insurers
might seek to exclude or limit such coverage in the future.174 If, however, a
given insurer did not cover fertility treatments, but had to cover expenses of
the pregnancy and neonatal care, it would still have an incentive to reduce a
fertility clinic’s record of multiple pregnancies. But because such a company
would not be covering the fertility treatments themselves, it would seem to
have no leverage to prevent multiple pregnancies in the first place.
With neither the government, the medical profession, nor the health
insurance industry in a good position to regulate assisted reproduction issues,
we must reluctantly turn to after-the-fact policing by private lawyers. If there
are enough successful lawsuits against the doctors, not only will individual
clients be recompensed, but their recompense will caution doctors to better
behave themselves in the future.
In sum, the lawyer with a client who has endured a drug-induced highorder multiple pregnancy with its attendant costs and suffering should first
examine the exact nature of the relationship between fertility doctor and
patient. Although the possibility of bringing the tort action should be foremost
in the lawyer’s mind, contract is important here. Sullivan v. O’Connor reminds
us that a jury reluctant to find medical negligence may still find that the
contract is breached.175
Most clinics and fertility doctors are careful not to make guarantees,
whether of a “money-back” nature or otherwise. The job of the lawyer is then
to comb the literature and statements of the fertility clinic to find actionable
promises, whether of an expressly contractual nature or sufficient to support an
action of promissory estoppel. According to Sullivan, either reliance or
expectation damages might be awarded for breach of contract, with the
reliance measure including damages for pain and suffering as well as costs

173. See Leo, supra note 69, at 20-21; see also Dorothy M. Robins, Comment, When the
Gleam in Your Eye Becomes a Glare: Capped Damages in Fertility Malpractice Actions, 26
U.S.F. L. REV. 717, 722 n.35 (1992).
174. See Robertson Interview, supra note 101.
175. See Sullivan, 296 N.E.2d at 184.
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incurred.176 Further, the case notes that restitution damages might also be
available, but would be unsatisfactory since they are limited to amounts paid
for the doctor’s fee.177 However, if the restitution damages in the high-order
multiple birth case could include costs paid by the family not only for the
fertility services, but by extension, those for the pregnancy and neonatal care,
this measure might also be attractive.178 If the successful count was
promissory estoppel, reliance or expectation damages are also generally
available.
What if no actionable promises can be found? Then we are in the realm of
tort, where the questions center around whether the doctor exhibited the
requisite standard of care in a scenario that ended up with a high-order multiple
birth.179 If he or she has not, the action could succeed under a generalized
malpractice (negligence) theory or under the newer concept of wrongful
conception, which holds the doctor/clinic liable for failing to prevent unwanted
infants, even if born normal.180 Damages in these actions can be quite high
and could include costs of the treatments to mother and children, physical and
emotional distress of the mother, emotional distress for other family members
and, in the case of malpractice, (rather than wrongful conception, which is
limited to parental injury), perhaps the physical and mental distress of the
infants themselves.181 A wrongful death action might also be brought on
behalf of an infant in a high-order multiple-birth who succumbs to his
deficiencies.182 The prospect of high damages in such a malpractice case
presumably brought the Frustacis their large settlement for Patti Frustaci’s
1985 septuplets.
There are other tort claims that might be made in these scenarios. Whether
or not the doctors’ actions reached the standard of medical malpractice (which
in jurisdictions like Massachusetts, juries notoriously refuse to find),183 there is
also the tort of failure to receive the patient’s informed consent to a
procedure.184 Several scenarios can be envisioned in which fertility patients
are not timely informed of the risk and consequences of multiple pregnancies
and of the necessity of selective reduction if multiple births are to be avoided.
Under the modern approach, such a failure to timely inform would generally be
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177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See id. at 188-89.
See id. at 186-87.
Such a lawsuit would involve joining the hospital as a defendant.
See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 47, at 336-37.
See id. at 526.
See id.
See Daar, supra note 7, at 775 n.4.
See generally RICHARD DANZIG, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW:
FURTHER READINGS ON WELL-KNOWN CASES 17 (1978).
184. See DOBBS & HAYDEN, supra note 47, at 359-62.
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treated under a negligence theory (rather than as an intentional tort) and
possible damages would be similar to those for other forms of negligence.
Furthermore, the doctor-patient relationship may be seen as a
“confidential” or “fiduciary” relationship which can be abused by the doctor in
a tortious way.This cause of action was expressly recognized by the court in
Moore,185 although the reference there was to the gaining of monetary
compensation by the doctors via the unauthorized use of their patient’s cells.
Although the specific outlines of the cause of action and resultant damages are
left unclear in Moore, there are analogies that can be drawn from ordinary
fiduciary law. The doctor, like a trustee, owes certain duties to his or her
“beneficiary” (the patient); primary among these would seem to be the placing
of that patient’s interests above those of all others, including himself. Just as a
trustee can be surcharged for violation of this duty of loyalty to the beneficiary,
so could the doctor be liable for violation of such a duty to his patient.
Arguably, failure by the doctor/clinic to timely advise the patient of the
multiple pregnancy/selective reduction problems might be seen as directly
benefiting the fertility doctor’s own financial interest or that of his or her
clinic. When the interests of the patient are placed second to the doctor’s
profit, the doctor and/or clinic should at least be liable to the patient for the
profit thereby wrongfully obtained. Whether this rather limited theory of
damages obtained from general fiduciary law could be expanded if the abuse
here was seen as tortious would be a question for future courts.
V. CONCLUSION
There are numerous possibilities for the lawyer attacking, after the fact, the
fertility doctor’s involvement in an unwanted high-order multiple pregnancy.
This stands in sharp contrast to the chances for the private bar to control
unconsented sperm harvesting, except by injunctions offering no direct
financial incentive to a plaintiff. Just as tort lawyers have successfully targeted
other “deep-pocket” industries such as asbestos and tobacco, they may be
encouraged to turn their attention to the problems such as high-order multiple
pregnancies that arise in a largely unregulated fertility industry. If a number of
lawyers start suing and winning after the fact, in these situations there will be a
benefit before the fact: doctors and clinics can be expected to be much more
careful about their consent and disclosure procedures. As imperfect as these
solutions may be, they may provide some answers for victims of multiple
births like those of the Frustacis. By contrast, those seeking compensation for
unconsented sperm harvesting from dead or comatose males must probably
await governmental action. The possibility of such action seems remote unless
a number of children result from this procedure and become a burden on the

185. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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state. Plaintiffs will thus probably have to be content with injunctive relief
based on the common law actions mentioned in this article.
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